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Abstract
In this paper, I propose three strategies to advance institutional 
analysis in resource and development econometrics: (1) recognition 
of institutional variables; (2) use of multilevel thinking and estimation; 
and (3) the adoption of causal graphs.  I illustrate each strategy 
with examples from three previously published studies: (a) biomass 
extraction from Ranthambhore National Park by Dayal (2006), (b) air 
pollution in Goa by Das et al. (2009), and (c) trade-offs and synergies 
between carbon storage and livelihood benefits from forest commons 
by Chhatre and Agrawal (2009).  As I see it, while there is no explicit 
institutional content in studies (a) and (b), by recognizing caste as a 
social norm and the role of norms in household decisions it is possible 
to further integrate an institutional perspective into these studies.  
My analysis also demonstrates how multilevel thinking is intrinsic 
to institutional thinking.  Since there can be data at different levels 
within a study, using study (c) where forests are nested in countries, 
I show how multilevel statistics can help unpack variation in the 
data at forest and country levels.  Similarly, since causality is vital to 
policy though extremely difficult to establish with observational data, 
a phenomenon that leads to disagreements among scholars, using 
examples from the three studies I show how causal graphs can help 
separate the disagreements between scholars into disagreements 
about the underlying causal structure and the correspondence 
between an agreed to causal structure and the data on hand.  The 
paper examines specific strategies to include institutional analysis  in 
resource econometrics.
Key Words: Institutions, Multilevel modelling, Causality, Resources, 
Development
1Analyzing Institutions in Resource and Development Econometrics
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Causes
1. Introduction
Many resource and development economists use econometrics and microeconomic theoretical models but do not 
incorporate perspectives from institutional economics into their work because often their formal training, like mine, 
does not include institutional economics.  Therefore, while they may, like me, have read institutional scholarship and 
feel that institutions are important, they may resemble the economists in the following quotation from Robert Solow 
(1990), where he draws attention to the fundamental importance of norms in the labor market—norms which have 
implications not just for the labor market but for the wider economy:
“I want to make the case  that the labor market really is different … it cannot be understood without 
taking account of the fact that participants, on both sides, have well developed notions of what is 
fair.… Among economists, it is not obvious at all that labor as a commodity is sufficiently different 
from artichokes (pp. 3 & 4).” 
Evidently, economists who wish to be more inclusive therefore need to do things a little differently from the typical 
economist that Solow describes above.  According to Schmid (2004), who discusses different ways of doing 
institutional analysis, econometrics and case studies are equally valid in institutional analysis, a view shared by 
Rodrik (2008).  In this paper, I concentrate on certain issues at the intersection of resource economics, institutional 
analysis and econometric analysis.  According to Ostrom (2005), a starting point for an institutional analysis is 
recognizing institutions.  But econometric analysis requires further conversion of institutions into a variable format, 
which may be imperfect.   Among institutional scholars, Ostrom is one who has stressed multiple levels throughout 
her career while the paper by Gibson et al. (2000) details questions of scale and associated levels in different 
disciplines.  In this paper, I link multilevel concepts with the statistical technique of multilevel modeling.  Although 
economists frequently use panel data econometrics, the use of multilevel modeling with cross-section data is still 
very limited.  However, recent years have seen a great renewal in questions of causality, with economists coming to 
rely more and more on experiments and quasi-experiments instead of the structural equation models which were 
a key area in traditional econometrics.  The present study draws on recent developments in causal graphs (Pearl, 
2000 and Spirtes et al., 1993) that have been exposited by Morgan and Winship (2007) in order to discuss causal 
issues.  
I suggest the following three strategies, which I discuss sequentially in the paper, to further integrate institutional 
analysis into resource and development econometrics: (1) recognition of institutional variables; (2) use of multilevel 
thinking and estimation; and (3) the adoption of causal graphs.  I will illustrate these strategies with examples from 
the following three studies: (a) what I will refer to as the “firewood extraction study” (Dayal, 2006); (b) what I will 
refer to as the “air pollution study” (Das et al., 2009); and (c) what I will refer to as the “carbon and livelihoods 
study” (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009).  I was the author of the first study while being a co-author in the second. 
In the “firewood extraction study,” Dayal (2006) focused on the extraction of forest biomass by village households 
and developed a microeconomic model of the decisions regarding levels and sources of extraction of forest 
biomass.  The study, which was an empirical examination of the biomass extraction behavior in a sample of 227 
households living in, and close to, Ranthambhore National Park, India, attempted to arrive at an empirical measure 
of the spatial aspects of extraction.  The study found village location, ownership of biogas, and caste to be key 
explanatory variables of forest biomass extraction. 
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In the “air pollution study,” Das et al. (2009) developed a theoretical model to guide the empirical examination of 
data on time allocation and exposure to air pollution in different microenvironments (outdoors, indoors, cooking, 
and workplace) and their effects on the respiratory health of people.  The sample was drawn from different clusters 
with different histories and different degrees of mining in the state of Goa, India.  The study found age and gender 
to play significant roles in time allocation.  The results of the study revealed that only those households that used 
biomass fuels alone were likely to experience indoor concentrations of air pollution that were greater than outdoor 
concentrations.  The factors affecting fuel choice were education, wealth and availability of commercial fuels.  
After accounting for endogeneity and measurement errors, the researchers found biomass fuel and smoking to be 
statistically significant factors in explaining chronic respiratory symptoms, even after factoring in exposure to air 
pollution indoors, outdoors and in the workplace.
In the “carbon and livelihoods study,” Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) focused on factors that affected tradeoffs and 
synergies between the level of carbon storage in forests and their contributions to livelihoods.  The authors found 
that larger forests were more effective in enhancing both carbon and livelihoods outcomes, particularly when local 
communities also had high levels of rule-making autonomy.  Their study drew on data from different countries 
gathered by the International Forestry Resources and Institution’s (IFRI) research program.
In this paper, I will be intuitive and informal, and will discuss the different theory and data interactions related to 
integrating institutional analysis in resource and development econometrics.
2. Recognizing Institutions
Vatn (2005) distinguishes between three different kinds of institutions: conventions, norms and formally sanctioned 
rules.  But Vatn (2005) sees a tension between the individualist and social constructivist positions in the social 
sciences with regard to the approach to institutions—a tension that can be plotted in terms of the direction of 
causality between individuals and institutions.  As Hodgson (2000) puts it: “In the writings of Veblen and Commons 
there is both upward and downward causation; individuals create and change institutions, just as institutions mold 
and constrain individuals” (p.326).  Ostrom (2005) points out that institutional analysis requires “digging deeper 
than markets and hierarchies” (p.819), the analyst having to recognize institutions that are often intangible, and not 
easily measurable.  Alston (1996) also draws attention to the difficulty of observing institutions quantitatively: 
“Institutional changes usually have some unique features limiting the data points and thus generally 
preventing conventional statistical analysis.…  Frequently, quantitative measures of the causes or 
consequences of institutional change are simply not available; even when they are available, better 
evidence may come from the qualitative historical record (pp. 29 &.30).”
Of the three case-studies under consideration in this paper, the first two studies, the fuelwood case study (Dayal, 
2006) and the air pollution case study (Das et al., 2009), did not have institutional analysis as an objective whereas 
the carbon storage and livelihood study aimed to study institutions (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009) using variables 
such as rule-making autonomy and ownership.  Since rule-making autonomy is difficult to observe quantitatively, 
Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) used perceptions of rules by users and assumed that when it was “about the right level 
of conservation”, the variable “AUTONOMY” equaled one whereas it was zero otherwise.  However, Ternstrom et 
al. (2010) have objected to the use of the term “autonomy” for this perceived phenomenon, arguing instead that 
the variable underlying autonomy appeared to reflect sustainability.  In their response to this objection, Chhatre 
and Agrawal (2010) recognized the underlying variable to be the perception of rules, which I consider to be a 
crucial variable.  However, the debate between Tersntrom et al. (2010) and Chhatre and Agrawal (2010) also draws 
attention to a feature in regression analysis where we are often forced to collapse something varied and complex 
into something binary.  Hence, when analyzing institutions quantitatively, we often translate a subtle social process 
into a variable whereas if prior thought about institutions goes into the research design a more nuanced approach is 
possible.  This approach is evidenced in the study by Chopra and Gulati (1998) where they captured the evolution of 
institutions over time by making distinctions in dummy variables. 
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Although institutional analysis was not the stated objective of the fuelwood case study (Dayal, 2006), it nevertheless 
contains important institutional elements. The study examines the fraction of a household’s extraction of fuelwood 
from Ranthambhore National Park, recognizing that a household can choose to source its gathered fuelwood from 
private land, village common land and the national park.  The fraction of a household’s extraction of fuelwood from 
Ranthambhore National Park is modeled in the microeconomic theoretical component (first stage: level; second: 
source/where) that guided the empirical analysis. 
In this study, the author regressed the fraction of fuelwood sourced from Ranthambhore National Park on the 
following explanatory variables:
•	 Caste dummy (Brahmin), statistically significant at 1% level;
•	 Village dummy (Indala), also statistically significant at 1% level;
•	 Quantity of land, statistically significant at 10% level;
•	 House type (a proxy for wealth), household size, fraction of males, cattle owned, and goats owned, which were 
not statistically significant.
These results encourage a closer examination of the role of caste in biomass extraction despite the inherent 
difficulties in analyzing its role.  As the above study shows, an economist using a microeconomic model and 
econometric analysis is not at ease with the bewildering variety of castes encountered in the field, the multivariate 
regression analysis employed using a dummy for only one or two castes (here Brahmin and low caste).  In 
consequence,  the analysis is coarse in its treatment of the variety of castes in a given Indian village.  In another 
paper, however, Dayal (2008) conducted a non-parametric small sample investigation of diverse castes in 
one village.  In this paper where the investigator did not have a formal model and did not use sophisticated 
econometrics, he showed that there was a great deal of heterogeneity among the different castes in their biomass 
extraction patterns, i.e., fuelwood, fodder and grazing (see Figure 1).
Conversations that I had in the field (in 2008) with key respondents confirmed the important role caste plays in bio-
mass extraction.  One respondent asserted that Gujjars were very comfortable with rearing goats while a Brahmin 
respondent thought that he knew more than the other castes about cattle-rearing because his cows gave him high 
yields.  But while caste has no role in the microeconomic model of Dayal (2006), it plays a role in the econometric 
model because applied economists control for ‘household characteristics’.  But it is a slow moving variable, with 
zero measurement error, in contrast to other variables, and that partly explains its statistical significance.  With the 
econometric evidence thus goading me, I therefore ventured into social ecology, and found Gadgil and Malhotra’s 
fascinating case study (1998) set in the Western Ghats, which provides a functional interpretation of caste and its 
ecological significance:
“The relatively simple society of the high-rainfall tracts near the crest of the Western Ghats is largely 
made up of small, often single-clan settlements of Kunbis and Gavlis. Here the Kunbis lived … in the 
lower valleys, while the Gavlis lived … on the upper hill terraces. … Thus, the cultivation of valleys and 
lower hill slopes was restricted to Kunbis and that of hill terraces to Gavlis; maintenance of livestock 
and use of fodder and grazing resources was largely with Gavlis, while Kunbis had the monopoly of 
hunting wild animals. (Gadgil and Malhotra, p.31)”
The above shows how caste and ecology have co-evolved over centuries in much of India and the dominant role 
that caste as a social norm plays in the traditional rural economy.  As Dasgupta (2012) says, “Social norms are 
not constructed out of thin air; they evolve” (p.186).  In the case of caste, he suggests that “exploitation can 
masquerade as cooperation” (p.180). These reflections on caste help those of us in resource economics to 
appreciate the tension in the social sciences between the individualist and social constructivist positions (Vatn, 
2005) and to recognize the role that caste plays as an institutional norm in Indian society.
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3.  Using Multilevel Thinking and Estimation
According to Luke (2004), context plays a role in virtually any situation studied by researchers—for example, a child 
learning or couples avoiding divorce.  As he puts it, “characteristics or processes occurring at a higher level of 
analysis are influencing characteristics or processes at a lower level” (p.1). 
A recurring characteristic of Elinor Ostrom’s work is the attention to levels.  In a 2000 study, Gibson, Ostrom and 
Ahn (2000) define scale as the spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used to measure and study 
any phenomenon.  They define levels as the units of analysis located at the same position on the scale while making 
a distinction between conceptual levels and spatial levels (see Figure 2).  For example, while international treaties 
are at the conceptual level of constitutional choice and spatially at the international level, buying land is at the 
conceptual level of operational choice and spatially at the level of the household.  According to hierarchy theorists, 
understanding a complex system requires zooming in and out to a higher and lower level. Thus, we can enrich 
economic analysis by examining institutions at different levels.
In the case studies in use in this paper, the units of analyses are nested at higher levels.  Hence, while households 
are nested in villages in the fuelwood paper, in the air pollution paper, individuals are nested in households that are 
nested in villages, which in turn are nested in mining clusters.  In the paper on carbon and livelihoods, on the other 
hand, forests are nested in countries. 
The fuelwood case study in Ranthambhore National Park, for instance, offers us levels related to caste and the 
Wildlife Act (Figure 3), where the legal rule, the Wildlife Act, determines the boundary of the Park.  In the case of the 
air pollution study that takes the mining regions of Goa as its study site, the institutions are the mining regulations 
and the gender norms related to cooking (see Figure 3).
Statistical multilevel modeling is one method to examine institutions at different levels.  Multilevel modeling is a 
generalization of regression methods that can improve prediction considerably (Gelman, 2006).  Intuitively, at its 
simplest, one can think of a simple regression of y on x, with an intercept.  While the observations on x may come 
from different groups, we could run a simple pooled regression where we ignore the grouping. We could then use 
a simple multilevel model where we let the intercept of the simple regression vary by group.  Using data on carbon 
storage from Chhatre and Agrawal (2009), I illustrate the model by regressing carbon storage on the perception 
of rules.  Figure 4 shows the pooled (over different countries) regression, and Figure 5 show the regression once 
we allow the intercept to vary with country.  As evident from Figure 5, the country intercept for India and Kenya 
respectively is considerably higher than in the pooled regression. 
Multilevel modeling also helps us unpack variations between and within groups.  While we could do an anova for 
this, Figure 6 shows that the variation in carbon storage between countries is substantial in comparison with the 
variation within countries.  The bold line in the boxes shows the median.  Thus, this clearly shows that there is a 
large difference between the median for India and for Mexico.  Since the width of the box shows the interquartile 
range, we can see graphically that the difference in values between India and Mexico is substantial relative to the 
variation within these countries.
Although more sophisticated and detailed multilevel models can be used, I will confine myself to one example from 
Luke (2004): with the reading score of a child as the dependent variable (Y) and the study time put in by the child 
(X) and size of class (W) as independent variables.  Based on these, a possible multilevel model would be:
Level 1: Yij = β0 + β1j Xij + rij
Level 2:  βoj = γ00 + γ01 Wj + u0j
 β1j  = γ10 + γ11 Wj + u1j
But the slopes and intercepts in the Level 1 equation can vary across classrooms.  According to Luke (2004), there 
are theoretical and statistical reasons for using multilevel variables.  Because phenomena are multilevel and depend 
on context, there is a theoretical justification; because regression coefficients can vary across contexts and errors 
can be correlated within contexts, there is a statistical justification. 
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However, all three case studies under consideration in this paper—the fuelwood study, the air pollution study, and 
the carbon storage and livelihoods study—do not use multilevel modeling.  As Luke (2004) points out,   “Despite the 
importance of context, throughout much of the history of the health and social sciences, investigators have tended 
to use analytic tools that could not handle these types of multilevel data and theories” (p.2).  While the carbon 
storage and livelihoods study has 10 groups and is therefore amenable to multi-level modeling, where the number 
of groups at the higher level is small, as in the fuelwood study (where it is four villages), multilevel modeling is not 
useful.  Therefore, while we can get richer predictions with multilevel modeling, Gelman (2006) cautions that “the 
‘direct’ and ‘contextual’ effects cannot necessarily be interpreted causally for observational data” (p.434) 
4.  Drawing Causal Graphs
4.1  Causality and Causal Diagrams
Causality is important because it is implicit in assertions on, or advocacy of, policies. We can distinguish between 
regression that is predictive or descriptive (conditional expectation) and causal.  Most econometric textbooks do 
not discuss causality.  Among the exceptions are Goldberger (1998), who clarifies and emphasizes the conditional 
expectation interpretation, and Gelman and Hill (2006) and Stock and Watson (2010), who make a clear distinction 
between models for prediction and those for causes. 
Economists however often think of the causal issue in terms of the identification of the parameters of a structural 
equation.  Manski (2006) provides an example of an identification problem that is relevant to this paper.  People in 
groups tend to behave similarly; this could be because of group norms (i.e., the endogenous effects) or because 
they have similar characteristics and environment (i.e., the correlated effects).  To achieve identification in the case 
of such problems, empirical observations by themselves are not enough.  We can divide the problem of inference 
into statistical and identification components.  The identification component consists of the conclusions that can be 
drawn with unlimited data.  The statistical component is about how sampling variability affects conclusions.  Manski 
(2006) however added that he came to the conclusion that “identification is the more fundamental problem” (p.5) in 
the course of his long research career.
Causal graphs help us see causal issues, which are easier to see but harder to resolve.  Some statisticians like 
Freedman (1991) have warned us about the pitfalls of using regression analysis for causal inference.  So Freedman 
(1991) praised John Snow’s careful work on cholera, which used “shoe leather and logic” (p.300) (i.e., field work 
and logic) rather than statistical techniques to arrive at causal inferences. 
The difficulty in dealing with causal issues is related to the nature of the research questions and the complexity of 
the systems.  For example, we can contrast the following two questions: (1) which of the following interventions 
has a greater effect on educational outcomes, school bag or blackboard, versus (2) what are the causes of 
deforestation in different countries? The causal issue is easier in the second than in the first. 
According to Greenland and Brumback (2002), there are four major types of causal models that are complementary. 
First, graphical models can illustrate qualitative population assumptions and sources of bias.  Second, sufficient-
component cause models can illustrate hypotheses about mechanisms of action.  Third, potential-outcome (or 
counterfactual) models can provide a basis for the quantitative analysis of effects.  Fourth, structural-equations 
models can provide a basis for quantitative analysis of effects. 
Greenland et al. (1999) advocate the use of causal diagrams since they “do not incorporate the strong parametric 
assumptions of conventional models; instead, they display assumptions about the web of causation that are 
not captured by conventional models” (p. 38).  I too prefer causal graphs because they help me ‘see’.  They are 
qualitative, so I don’t get swamped by statistical detail, which is not to say that that it is unimportant.  However, 
since I have used system dynamics type simulation, I am aware of causal feedback loop diagrams.  Moreover, I think 
causal graphs can foster communication between different groups of scholars. 
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Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993) and Pearl (2000) are key publications in the development of modern causal 
graphs, more specifically, of directed acyclic graphs used for exploring causality.  Pearl (1999) emphasizes the 
distinction between causal thinking and probability theory:
“The word cause is not in the vocabulary of standard probability theory. It is an embarrassing yet 
inescapable fact that probability theory, the official language of many empirical sciences, does 
not permit us to express sentences such as ‘Mud does not cause rain’; all we can say is that the 
two events are mutually correlated, or dependent – meaning that if we find one, we can expect to 
encounter the other. Scientists seeking causal explanations for complex phenomena or rationales 
for policy decisions must therefore supplement the language of probability with a vocabulary for 
causality, one in which the symbolic representation for the causal relationship ‘Mud does not cause 
rain’ is distinct from the symbolic representation for ‘Mud is independent of rain’. (p.1)”
To summarize, we use probability thinking for empirical work, but causal thinking requires us to put in a directional 
arrow: rain → mud.
Two relatively accessible and applied expositions move between the models of causality that Greenland and 
Brumback (2002) discuss.  While Shipley (2000) moves between structural equation models and causal graphs in 
biology, Morgan and Winship (2007) move between the potential outcome model and causal graphs, with examples 
from social science.  In this paper, I draw heavily on Morgan and Winship (2007) in intuitively conveying what causal 
graphs are and, later, when I discuss the interpretation of an instrumental variable. 
A regression Y = a + b X1 + c X2 + e can be interpreted predictively or causally. Predictively, we say the regression 
gives us the conditional expectation of Y.  If we interpret it causally, we have in mind an implicit causal graph (as in 
Figure 7) while the correctness of this causal interpretation depends on the correctness of the implicit causal graph 
for the situation that we are studying.  If the causal pathways do not correspond with what appears in Figure 7, then 
the causal interpretation is problematic.
If we want to explore the effect of X on Y, following Winship and Morgan, we can list the key ingredients of causal 
graphs as follows:
•	 Common	cause	(controlling	for	M,	the	common	cause,	will	block	path):	X	←	M	→ Y
•	 Mediator	(controlling	for	Z,	will	block	path):	X	→	Z	→	Y
•	 Collider	(controlling	for	B,	opens	path):	X	→	B	←	Y
Whether we should control for a variable depends on whether it is a common cause, a mediator, or a collider.  
However, we need to see the causal graph as a whole.  Figure 8 illustrates three specification options for studying 
the effect of X on Y, given the causal graph. 
The intuition for excluding the collider is best given with an example.  Assume a situation where a car fails to start 
in cold weather where there is petrol in the tank.  While petrol in the tank of a car and very cold weather are on the 
face of it uncorrelated, they can be common causes of a car failing to start in cold climates.  The car not starting 
is the collider.  Whether there is petrol in the car or not tells me nothing about cold weather.  But if my car fails to 
start, and there is petrol in the tank, I would make an educated guess that it is cold weather that is the cause. 
Thus, directed acyclic graphs can be used to understand specification, the use of instrumental variables, the 
design of experiments, etc.  However, they are not cyclic, i.e., they do not include instantaneous feedback, with 
feedback complicating causal enquiry by this means (Shipley, 2000).  This is a serious limitation, for according 
to Dasgupta (2009), feedback is central to resource and development economics: “Theoretical considerations 
and empirical evidence show that the persistence of poverty in a world of economic progress should be traced 
to socioeconomic, metabolic, and ecological processes involving positive feedback” (p.7).  Structural equations 
modeling can handle instantaneous feedback.  Feedback is central to systems dynamics, which simulates causal 
stock and flow structures, with the simulations based on a spectrum of information—case studies, experiments etc.  
Timmins and Schlenker (2009) argue that structural modeling and reduced form modeling are complementary with 
one advantage of the former over the latter being its ability to engage with feedback processes.  Chopra and Gulati 
(1998) have used a structural equations system to capture some of the feedback aspects.
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However, we can overcome this problem of representing feedback if we can make the time ordering explicit and can 
slice time.  In such situations, the instantaneous cyclic representation can be converted into an acyclic one: that is, 
instead	of	X		←		→	Y	we	can	have	X1	→	Y2	and	Y1	→	X2,	where	1	and	2	represent	time.	
4.2  Causal Issues in Chhatre and Agrawal 
Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) appear to be using a causal interpretation of regression since they make reference 
to causal pathways.  Heuristically, a causal graph can help us see what difficulties we face when, like Chhatre and 
Agrawal (2009), we use cross-section data to model a dynamic, path-dependent process.  Although Ternstrom et 
al. (2010) raise the issue of the dynamics of the resource, Chhatre and Agrawal, as evident from their response 
(2010), are quite aware of the issue, pointing to data limitations such as the lack of panel data that are common 
to quantitative studies of the commons.  Carbon storage and livelihoods have a dynamic element in that carbon 
storage and livelihoods can both be high today but fall tomorrow (Ternstrom et al., 2010).  Even with a very 
simplistic causal graph of carbon storage and livelihoods, which abstracts from such biophysical details as fire and 
grazing and institutional details, the causal graph brings out our difficulties (Figure 9).
We only observe values for the last time-period in a long process with path dependence. However, a cross-section 
will sometimes have a large variation in a slow-moving variable while high frequency time series will give us variation 
in fast-moving variables.  And institutions are usually slow-moving variables.  We can use such cross-sectional data 
in descriptive regression and speculate about possible causal mechanisms, aware that the regression is only a 
shadow of these. 
In an empirical enquiry we could think of a causal graph, but where would that come from?  It could be from a 
microeconomic model or theory.  However, different disciplines have different styles of theorizing, each discipline 
concentrating more often than not on certain kinds of causal pathways.  Nevertheless, scholars from different 
disciplines could brainstorm and think about possible pathways.  Again, by way of illustration, I refer to the paper 
by Chhatre and Agrawal (2009), my paper (Dayal 2006), and to my knowledge of similar economic studies (for 
example, Pattanayak et al., 2004), while drawing also on Gibson, McKean and Ostrom (2000).  As Figure 10 
makes evident, there are different categories of pathways: institutional, economic, sociological, contextual and 
biophysical.  The causal link (I1 in Figure 10) between rules in use and extraction and, thereby, forest stock is one 
of the key insights of the volume titled People and Forests edited by Gibson, McKean and Ostrom (2000).  Schweik 
(2000) found that institutional factors—such as the caste system and the status of rule monitoring—along with 
factors such as distance and geographical barriers played a role in the spatial distribution of shorea robusta in 
the Chitwan District of Nepal while Agrawal (2000), who engaged in an empirical study of village forest councils 
in Almora district in India, found that smaller forest councils were less successful in collective action than larger 
forest councils—suggesting the causal paths I5 and I6 in Figure 10.  Economic studies such as those by Pattanayak 
et al. (2004) and Dayal (2006) emphasize the causal pathway E1.  The variables that are enclosed in Figure 10 
are observed in the Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) dataset.  We could also decide to focus on how carbon stock 
is affected by rule perception.  So carbon stock is in a circle.  We can then focus on pathways relating to these 
variables.  It might also be fruitful to do a causal EDA, i.e., explore data with a causal graph such as Figure 10.
Apart from the number of causal pathways, there are other issues that need attention such as the issue of 
complicated feedbacks, the possibility that some causal arrows might be time- and context-specific, and the fact 
that there might be path dependence and evolution. 
At times, some pointed potential outcome type studies can be done as, for example, in Somanathan et al. (2009); 
these focus on potential outcomes that are abstracted from the diverse causal processes.  We may cite what 
happens in a clinical trial by way of example.  In clinical trials of a new pill, when the pill is ingested, something 
happens inside the treated person over a period of time, which may or may not cure the person’s headache, on the 
basis of which the researcher is able to arrive at the causal inference that the pill on average cures headaches or 
not. 
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4.3  Reinterpreting a Causal Tool (Instrumental Variable)
I now offer a re-interpretation of the instrumental variable that is meant to unpack causality using the air pollution 
study by Das et al. (2009) as my example.  The authors of the study had worked several summers trying to examine 
the effect of total exposure to air pollution (i.e., indoor plus outdoor pollution, etc., weighted by the time spent).  
We were struggling because it was not ‘right’ in our judgment since we knew we had a measurement error and we 
suspected endogeneity.  As seen in Figure 11a, exposure is a cause of sickness which is a cause of the inability to 
work, which in turn affects the allocation of time to different activities and exposure to air pollution.  In Figure 11b, 
the disturbance term is the common cause of both exposure and sickness.  However, the paper by Pitt et al. (2005) 
on the health effects of indoor air pollution, which uses female hierarchy as an instrumental variable, helped us to 
establish the causal effect of exposure on sickness as evident in Figures 11a and 11b.  In the theoretical model 
that we used, as with Pitt et al. (2005), we assumed that the household was optimizing utility, which guided the 
empirical research.  Since this assumption solved the problem at hand, we were able to conclude the research on a 
triumphant note.  
However, in a detailed discussion, Agarwal (1997) points out that while economists have improved on unitary 
models by developing bargaining models of the household, they have left out social norms from the account.  Social 
norms, Agarwal (1997) maintains, are exogenous in the short run but endogenous in the long run and, therefore, (1) 
set limits to the domain of bargaining, (2) determine bargaining power, and (3) influence the conduct of bargaining.  
However, Agarwal (1997) offers a methodological suggestion to the perceived problem: 
“I both use and emphasize the usefulness of what I term ‘analytical description’ for capturing the 
complexity and historic variability of gender relations in intra- and extra-household dynamics. By 
analytical description I mean a formulation that seeks to comprehensively spell out both qualitative 
and quantitative factors that might impinge on outcomes, without being pre-constrained by the 
structure that formal modeling imposes, or by data limitations. (p.2)”
Similarly, Akerlof and Kranton (2010), who argue that gender matters in the workplace in the United States, 
suggest that careful observations rather than statistical tests are more enlightening in studying identity.  Following 
Friedman’s (1953) ideas about “The Methodology of Positive Economics” broadly, Das et al. (2009) did not worry 
much about whether the household was actually optimizing; what mattered to them most was the prediction or 
getting the regression ‘right’.  But the efficacy of the instrumental variable—female hierarchy, in this instance—
should make us pause because it lends support to a view of the household which is in tune with the role of norms 
and identity. 
The disadvantage of analytical description is that we may be uncomfortable about its validity.  Therefore questions 
of validity should inform the design of further studies that seek to go beyond analytical description although this 
may be difficult.  In a perceptive paper on ‘Behavior, Environment and Health in Developing Countries: Evaluation 
and Valuation,’ Pattanayak and Pfaff stress the importance of social interactions and the difficulty in identifying 
them empirically (2009).
5.  Conclusions and Recommendations
Though the use of experiments and quasi-experiments is increasing rapidly in the field of economics, observational 
data is rich with different processes and slow-moving variables might have the time to leave their imprints on 
cross-sectional data.  In 1989, Norgaard had pleaded for methodological pluralism while Barrett and Carter, 
in a 2010 discussion of experiments, maintain that ‘development economics requires healthy methodological 
pluralism that recognizes all identification strategies’ intrinsic limitations’ (p.543).  It is therefore evident that we 
need to recognize institutional variables, which may not exist in our theory, and may be hard to measure.  Where 
institutional variables may be there in our regressions, we need to interpret them carefully.  We can balance 
the tension between macro and micro, agency and structure, to some extent, with multilevel modeling.  We can 
describe data with regression, and graphs and multilevel models can help in doing so.  We can use causal graphs 
to help further understand causal paths. We can exploit thick descriptive historical case studies (when we expect 
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path dependence), sociological studies (that may report on social construction), potential outcome studies, and 
simulation studies of social ecological systems (that may make strong causal assumptions), and synthesize from 
these.  While Ostrom used a variety of methods, including meta-analysis of case studies with the Institutions and 
Development Framework (see Ostrom, 2009), Dasgupta (2003) made use of ‘ideas and information culled from 
a number of disciplines: anthropology, demography, ecology, economics …’ (p.ix), anchored by short appendices 
with theoretical models, in order to establish a ‘composite characterization’ in his ‘Inquiry Into Well-Being and 
Destitution.’  
In sum, the discussion above strives to demonstrate how resource economists can move on the path of 
methodological pluralism in institutional analysis by recognizing institutions, using multilevel models, and adopting 
causal graphs.
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Figure 3:  Levels and Institutions in the Fuelwood and Air Pollution Case Studies
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